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TRANSFORMING TRADE SECRET THEFT
VIOLATIONS INTO FEDERAL CRIMES: THE
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT
Lorin L. Reisner"
INTRODUCTION
The law of intellectual property is becoming increasingly
criminalized. Violations of the copyright law are punishable as
federal criminal offenses.' Trafficking in goods or services using
counterfeit trademarks also violates federal criminal law. 2 No law,
however, has more potential to transform a broad category of
intellectual property violations traditionally carrying civil liability
into federal felonies than the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (the
3
"EEA"),
which creates federal criminal liability for the theft of
trade secrets.
* Lorin L. Reisner is a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton in New York and a
former Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York.
R. Townsend Davis, Jr., a Debevoise & Plimpton associate, assisted in the
preparation of this article.
'See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1998); see also 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1998). Section 506
provides in pertinent part: "Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be punished
as provided in section 2319 of title 18." Id. Congress recently enacted the "No
Electronic Theft Act," which expanded the scope of criminal liability for
copyright infringement and increased the maximum fines and terms of
imprisonment No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678
(1997).
2 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1998). This section provides in pertinent part:
Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods
or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in
connection with such goods or services shall, if an individual,
be fined not more than $2,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both, and, if a person other than an
individual, be fined, not more than $5,000,000. In case of an
offense by a person under this section that occurs after that
person is convicted of another offense under this section, the
person convicted, if an individual, shall be fined not more than
$5,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and
if other than an individual, shall be fined not more than
S15,000,000.
Id.
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I. THE EEA
Before the EEA was enacted, federal law had little impact on
trade secrets matters. 4 Owners of trade secrets relied primarily on
state law and the traditional civil remedies of damages and
injunctive relief to protect their proprietary information.
In February 1996, FBI Director Louis Freeh asked Congress for
greater authority to combat economic espionage against U.S.
companies.5 This request was based on a concern that American
companies had suffered billions of dollars in lost revenues, lost
jobs and reduced market share as a result of trade secret theft. As
the Senate Report supporting the legislation observed: "Today, a
piece of information can be as valuable as a factory is to a
business. The theft of that information can do more harm than if
an arsonist torched that factory." 6 The EEA was enacted in
October 1996. 7
The EEA has two principal sections: one prohibiting the theft of
trade secrets with intent to benefit a foreign government 8 and

3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839(1996).

4 See generally Gerald Mossinghoff, The Economic Espionage Act: A New
FederalRegime of Trade Secret Protection,79 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y

191 (1997) (discussing economic espionage and the creation of federal
legislation to more effectively regulate and prevent the theft of trade secrets).
5See Mossinghoff, supra note 4, at 192. Two significant hearings were held to
consider the necessity for additional Federal legislation to prevent trade secrets
theft resulting from economic espionage. Id. Director Freeh was the lead
witness in the hearings. Id.
6S.REP. 104-359, 1996 WL 497065 at *7.
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq.
818 U.S.C. § 1831 (1996). This section provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit
any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign
agent, knowingly(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a
trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs,
downloads,
uploads,
alters,
destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, or conveys a trade secret;
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another prohibiting trade secrets theft more generally. 9 Under 18
U.S.C. Section 1832, a crime is committed by any person who
with intent to convert a trade secret ... to the economic benefit of
anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing
that the offense will injure any owner of that trade secret,
knowingly (1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such
information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or
conveys such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted
without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1)
through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any
offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy."0

A "trade secret" is defined broadly as information that (1)
the owner has taken "reasonable measures" to keep secret and
(2) derives "independent economic value" from "not being
generally known to" and not being "readily ascertainable
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or
converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of
paragraphs (1) through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any
offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy,
shall, except as provided in subdivision (b), be fined not more
than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
Id.
9

See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (1996).
'oSee 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1996).
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through proper means by the public."" Trade secrets can
include any type of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic or engineering information that satisfies these two
requirements. 2
A violation of Section 1832 carries a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years and fines in
excess of $250,000 for an individual 13 and $5 million for an
organization. 4 The EEA also contains a provision for
forfeiture of all property used to commit or derived from the
proceeds of an offense.' 5

"18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (1996). This section provides in pertinent part:
The term "trade secret" means all forms and types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, programs
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized
physically,
electronically,
graphically,
photographically, or in writing if(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and
(B) the information derived independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public.
Id. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1339 (6th ed. 1990). (Trade
secret defined as a "formula, pattern, device or compilations of information
which is used in one's business and which gives one opportunity to obtain
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.").
12See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (1996).
13See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1996). This section provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to
or included in a product that is produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of
anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will injure any owner of that trade
secret... shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id.
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(b) (1996).
This section provides that "[a]ny
organization that commits any offense described in section (b), shall be fined not
more than $5,000,000." Id.
15See 18 U.S.C. § 1834(a) (1996). This section provides in pertinent part:
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II.
PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE EEA
There
have been six publicly-reported prosecutions under the
6
EEA.1
A. The Worthing Case 7
In the first reported EEA prosecution, Patrick Worthing, an
employee of fiberglass research company PPG Industries, Inc., was
charged with attempting to sell secret information relating to
PPG's customers and auto-parts manufacturing process to OwensComing, a PPG rival.' 8 In particular, the Government alleged that
Worthing propositioned Owens-Coming's CEO under an assumed
name in a letter that stated: "Would it be of any profit to OwensComing to have the inside track on PPG?"' 9 The Owens-Coming
executive provided the letter to PPG, which then contacted the
FBI.20 During an FBI undercover investigation that followed,
Worthing requested cash payments in exchange for confidential
information.2 ' He later admitted to stealing documents, blueprints,
The court, in imposing sentence on a person for a violation of

this chapter, shall order, in addition to any other sentence
imposed, that the person forfeit to the United States (1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds

the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such
violation; and

(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission
of such violation, if the court in its discretion so determines,
taking into consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality
of the use of the property in the offense.
Id.6
1

See infra notes 18-61 and accompanying text.

17 United

States v. Worthing, No. 97-9 (W.D. Pa., Dec. 9, 1996) (crim.

indictment).
'sId
19See Affidavit of Bruce T. Rupert in Support of Criminal Compl., United

States
v. Worthing, No. 96-2844M (W.D. Pa., Dec. 9, 1996).
20
id
21 Id
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photographs, and product samples from PPG.22 Worthing pled
guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15
months.23
24

B. The Gillette Case

In September 1997, a grand jury in the Middle District of
Tennessee indicted another "insider" with access to technical
knowledge, Steven L. Davis. 25 Davis was an engineer employed
by Wright Industries, Inc., a contractor engaged by Gillette to
develop production equipment for a new shaving design.26 He was
alleged to have downloaded 600 "megs" of secret data and
27
drawings from the Gillette project onto his laptop computer.
Davis then distributed the information to Gillette competitors by
fax and electronic mail. 28 Davis was charged with copying and
attempting to steal, copy or possess trade secrets in violation of the
EEA.29 In January 1998, he pled guilty to EEA violations and is
currently awaiting sentencing.

22 Id.
23

United States v. Worthing, No. 97-9-1 (W.D. Pa., June 5,

1997).

Worthing's brother also pled guilty to conspiracy to violate the EEA and

received five years probation. United States v. Worthing, Crim. No. 97-9-2
(W.D. Pa., April 18, 1997).
24 United States v. Davis, No. 3:97-00124 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 24, 1997) (crim.
indictment).
25

id.

26

Id. Through faxes and electronic mail, along with the use of pseudonyms,

Davis allegedly transmitted the new shaving system to Gillette competitors such
as Warner Lambert Company, BIC and American Safety Razor company. Id.
See also A. Primer, Protecting Your Client Under the Espionage Act, 80 J. PAT.
&27TRADEMARK OFF. SOCIETY 360, 365 (1998).
United States v. Davis, No. 3:97-00124 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 24, 1997) (crim.
Indictment).
28

id

29

Id.
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C. The "FourPillars" Case30
Two EEA prosecutions have involved alleged efforts by foreign
companies to extract trade secrets from "insiders" employed by
U.S. companies. The defendant in an Ohio case, Ten Hong
"Victor" Lee, was an employee of Avery Dennison Corporation -a large adhesive products manufacturer -- who provided
manufacturing and research information about Avery's business to
Four Pillars, a Taiwanese company, in exchange for cash payments
over a seven-year period.3 Lee worked for Avery as a scientist
and had access to a broad range of information at Avery's
technical facility in Concord, Ohio. 32 After FBI surveillance
captured Lee on closed-circuit TV rummaging a colleague's files
containing confidential documents, Lee was arrested.33
He
subsequently pled guilty and admitted to having provided Four
Pillars with secret adhesives 34formulae and testing data valued at
between $50 and $60 million.
After his arrest, Lee cooperated with the government and
arranged a meeting with the chairman of Four Pillars, Pin Yen3
Yang, and his daughter, also an employee of Four Pillars.
Shortly after this meeting, the Yangs and Four Pillars were charged
with attempting to steal trade secrets in violation of the EEA.36
The defendants are awaiting trial.

30 United States v. Yang, Crim. No. 97-288 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 4, 1997) (crim.
compl.).
31
id

32id
33 id.
34id.

35 Id. Federal prosecutors estimated a cost of fifty million dollars to develop
the subject information. Id. Following the indictment, Avery Dennison filed an
action under RICO, and froze defendants' assets. Id. The Yangs have since
been under electronic monitoring in Cleveland. Id.
36 Id. See also Dean Starkman, Secret and Lies: The Dual Career of a
CorporateSpy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at BI.
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37
D. The Taxol Case

In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a two-year FBI
undercover operation resulted in the arrest last year of two
employees of a Taiwanese company alleged to have offered cash
payments in exchange for the secret formula for the anti-cancer
drug Taxol, which had sales of $941 million in 1997 and is
allegedly one of Bristol-Myers's most closely-guarded secrets.38
After Kai-Lo Hsu and Jessica H. Chou of the Yueng Foong Paper
Company expressed interest to an undercover FBI agent in
obtaining the Taxol formula, a meeting was arranged between the
defendants and a fictitious "corrupt scientist" at Bristol-Myers to
discuss cash payments to the scientist. 39 The meeting took place at
a Philadelphia hotel, where the agent was accompanied by an
actual Bristol-Myers employee. 40
During the meeting, the
defendants discussed their interest in acquiring technology that
would advance their research efforts.4 ' They were subsequently
arrested and charged with attempt and conspiracy to receive trade
secrets in violation of the EEA.42
The pretrial phase of the Hsu case demonstrates the classic
tension in trade secrets litigation between preserving the secrecy of
allegedly stolen trade secrets during litigation and the rules of
pretrial discovery. 43 This tension is heightened in criminal cases,
where defendants have a right to discover materials under both
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and as a matter
of constitutional law.
37 United

States v. Hsu, crim. 97-323 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (crim. compl.); (July 10,
1997) (crim. indictment). See also Francis A. McMorris, Corporate-Spy Case
Rebounds on Bristol, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at B5.
38See United States v. Hsu. Crim. 97-323 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (crim. compl.); (July
10, 1998) (crim. indictment).
39 Id. The "corrupt scientist" was a Bristol-Meyers employee who cooperated
with the FBI. Id.
40

41

Id.
Id. The Bristol-Meyers scientist was asked several questions about Taxol's

technology after viewing documents showing scientific data and technological
processes. Id.
42 Id. The indictment alleges that the documents were marked "BristolMeyers" and stamped "confidential." Id.
43

id.
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At the outset of the Hsu case, the Government sought a
protective order under the EEA 4 to limit the disclosure of BristolMyers documents, arguing that disclosure would reveal the very
trade secrets that formed the basis of the prosecution. Prosecutors
proposed an in camera review during which the court could redact
documents containing confidential trade secrets. 4' The defendants
proposed an alternative order that would require production of the
information, but limit the disclosure of material designated by the
Government as "confidential" only to individuals requiring access
to the documents for defense purposes, such as defendants'
attorneys, outside experts and prospective witnesses. 6
The district court rejected the Government's application and
adopted the order proposed by the defendants. 47 In reaching its
conclusion, the court observed that denying defendants discovery
of material deemed by the court to be "trade secrets" would
"effectively be relieving the Government of the burden of proving
one of the essential elements of its case: the existence of a trade
secret."48 The court emphasized that the determination of what
constituted a "trade secret" was for the jury at trial and not the
proper subject of a pretrial ruling by the court.49 The court also
suggested that denying the defendants the materials would violate

44 Id

See also 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (1996). This section authorizes courts to

issue orders as necessary to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets and
provides in pertinent part:

In any prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the
court shall enter such orders and take such other action as may
be necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of
trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of the Federal

Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and all other applicable laws. An interlocutory
appeal by the United States shall lie from a decision or order
of a district court authorizing or directing the disclosure of any
trade secret.
Id.45

United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

46Id at 1023.
47Id at 1029.
4Sld at 1024.
49 id.
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their rights 50 under the Confrontation

Clause of the

[Vol 15
Sixth

Amendment.

On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order.5 '
The Court of Appeals observed that because the government
charged the defendants only with an attempt and conspiracy to
violate the EEA - and not with the completed offense of theft of
trade secrets - the existence of a "trade secret" was not a required
element of the charged offenses. In reaching this determination,
the court held that "legal impossibility" is not a defense to
attempted misappropriation of trade secrets or conspiracy to violate
the EEA. 52 The court stated:
[T]he government need not prove that an actual trade secret was
used during an EEA investigation, because a defendant's

culpability for a charge of attempt depends only on "the
circumstances as he believes them to be," not as they really are.
The government can satisfy its burden under § 1832(4) by proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sought to aquire
information which he or she believed to be a trade secret,
regardless of whether the information actually qualified as such. 3
The Court therefore concluded that the defendants had no

constitutional or statutory right to view the unredacted portion of
the Taxol documents. The case was remanded to the district court
for an in camera review to assess whether the documents were
properly redacted only to exclude confidential information and
whether any of the redacted information was "material" to the
54
defense.

'0 Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
51 United States v. Hsu, 1998 WL 538221,47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1784 (3d Cir. 1998).
52 Id. at 8, 13.
53 Id.
54

Id. at 16.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/6

10

Reisner: Trade Secret

1998

TRADE SECRETS

55
E. The Deloitte & Touche Case

Federal prosecutors in the Southern District of Texas charged
Mayra Justine Trujillo-Cohen, a former employee of Deloitte &
Touche (the accounting and management consulting firm) with
violating the EEA by attempting to sell confidential Deloitte &
Touche software programs.s6 Trujillo-Cohen was alleged to have
downloaded the programs onto her personal laptop computer while
employed by Deloitte & Touche and later to have engaged in
negotiations to sell the software package to a company in New
York for $7 million.?7 The indictment charges her with two counts
of violating the EEA5 8
59

F.The Pei Case

In the District of New Jersey, an FBI investigation resulted in the
arrest of Huang Doa Pei who is alleged to have attempted to steal
trade secrets from his former employer, Roche Diagnostics
("Roche").

60

The criminal complaint alleges that Pei approached a

Roche scientist to obtain confidential information about Roche's
Hepatitis C diagnostic monitoring kit ("HCV Kit"). Pei allegedly
6
intended to develop and market a HCV Kit for sale in China. I
During recorded conversations, Pei allegedly stated that he
intended to translate confidential Roche documents into Chinese,
cut off relevant names and bring the documents to China.
Pei has since posted a $100,000.00 surety bond and is free on
bail.

5- United States v. Trujillo-Cohen, No. 97-251 (S.D. Tex., November 14,

1997) (crim. indictment).
56 id

57

id.

58

id

59
60 United States v. Pei, No. 4090-01 (D.N.J. July 27, 1998) (crim. compl.).
id
61
id
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III. THE REUTERS/BLOOMBERG INVESTIGATION
The EEA may receive its most high-profile application in an
investigation currently being conducted by federal prosecutors into
whether an American subsidiary of Reuters Holdings P.L.C. stole
trade secrets from its competitor, Bloomberg L.P.
The
investigation reportedly is focused on whether Reuters attempted
to obtain the operating code used for a highly successful
Bloomberg market data system for use in connection with a
competing desktop product sold by Reuters. Although initial news
reports suggested that Reuters may have participated in "electronic
break-ins" of Bloomberg's computers,62 more recent reports have
suggested that a consultant hired by Reuters may have simply
subscribed to the Bloomberg service and received information that
was readily available to thousands of Bloomberg customers. The
Reuters/Bloomberg matter may therefore raise novel questions
concerning the scope of "reverse engineering" permitted by the
EEA and the extent to which subscription agreements and other
contractual restrictions imposed upon recipients of information
may serve as the basis for a criminal prosecution under the EEA.
Although the EEA does not expressly address the issue of
"reverse engineering," its legislative history suggests the law
would not be violated "if a person can look at a product and, by
using their own general skills and expertise, dissect the necessary
attributes of the product."63 Limitations on "reverse engineering"
and disclosure of information also may be imposed by contractual
restrictions on how recipients may use information.
Whether
breaches of these types of contractual restrictions should rise to the
level of criminal offenses, however, is not a settled issue. 65 A
reasonable argument certainly can be made that the EEA was not
intended to criminalize ordinary claims for breach of a subscription
or license agreement. As one of the Bill's sponsors emphasized,
62

See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Reuters Unit Is Investigated Over Theft of a

Rival's Data, N.Y. TIMES, January 30, 1998, at A I(discussing whether Reuters,

a financial information and news giant, employed computer experts to pilfer

confidential information from the computers of Bloomberg, a major rival).
63 142 CONG. REc. at S12212 (Managers' Statement).
64 142 CONG. REc. at S10886 (remarks of Sen. Kohl).
65 Id.
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the EEA was intended to reach only "flagrant and egregious cases
of information theft."'
IV. THE FUTURE OF TIlE EEA
Criminal prosecution under the EEA should proceed with
caution. The statutory language gives prosecutors wide discretion
to challenge a broad range of commercial activities, some of which
either may be permitted under state trade secrets law or properly
subject only to civil sanctions. 67 Attorney General Janet Reno
recognized the potential danger of criminalizing the law of trade
secrets by pledging to have all federal prosecutions under the EEA
in its first five years specifically approved by the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division.'
Prosecutors are likely to continue to bring charges under the
EEA in paradigm scenarios involving payments to a company
"insider" in exchange for trade secrets, or breaking into a building
or a secure computer system to obtain secret data - the type of
industrial espionage Congress clearly intended to curb. Cases
lacking these elements -- such as those involving reverse
engineering of widely distributed products or the interpretation of
restrictive provisions of license or subscription agreements -- may
be more appropriately resolved through civil litigation. A careful
application of the EEA is necessary to strike the right balance
between preventing the theft of secret information through acts of
trespass, bribery, corruption or fraud, and permitting the
reasonable study and use of available information to develop new
and improved products without the threat of criminal sanctions.

REc. at S12212 (remarks of Sen. Kohl).
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1996).
68 See Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Senator Orrin G. Hatch
66 142 CONG.

67See

(October 1, 1996) (reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. at S12214).
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